El referéndum revocatorio y la democracia. Un análisis de recientes experiencias en Bogotá y Lima by Welp, Yanina & Rey, Julieta
71
Recall referendum and democracy 
An analysis of recent experiences 
in Bogota and Lima1
El referéndum revocatorio y la democracia. Un análisis 
de recientes experiencias en Bogotá y Lima
Yanina Welp 
CENTER .FOR .RESEARCH .ON .DIRECT .DEMOCRACY .(C2D), .
ZENTRUM .FÜR .DEMOKRATIE .AARAU, .
UNIVERSITY .OF .ZURICH, .SWITZERLAND
 .yanina .welp@zda .uzh .ch
Julieta Rey
CENTER .FOR .RESEARCH .ON .DIRECT .DEMOCRACY .(C2D), .
ZENTRUM .FÜR .DEMOKRATIE .AARAU, .
UNIVERSITY .OF .ZURICH, .SWITZERLAND
SUMMARY
From the early nineties, the Andean countries have undergone transformations of 
their legal frameworks to move from a purely representative model to include a wide 
range of institutions of citizen participation. Colombia and Peru were leaders in 
doing so and recently have been on the forefront again, activating for the first time 
the recall referenda against the mayors of the capital cities, Bogota and Lima. This 
article focuses on that experience in order to analyze the extent to which these express 
a good performance of democracy, the institutional design of the recall referenda, the 
role of the main actors involved and the results of both processes.
KEYWORDS: recall referenda, mechanisms of direct democracy, representation, 
democracy, legitimacy.
RESUMEN
Desde principios de los años noventa, los países andinos han experimentado 
transformaciones de sus marcos legislativos para pasar desde un modelo puramente 
representativo hacia un modelo con toda una gama de instituciones de la participación 
ciudadana. Colombia y Perú fueron líderes en eso y últimamente de nuevo han estado 
en la vanguardia, activando por la primera vez los referendos revocatorios contra 
1 .  .This .is .a revisited .version .of .a paper .published .in .Spanish .Revocatoria del mandato y de-
mocracia, .in .“Democracias”, .no .2, .2014 . .
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los alcaldes de dos capitales, Bogotá y Lima. El artículo se enfoca en esa experiencia 
para analizar hasta que medida estos referendos constituyen una expresión del buen 
funcionamiento de la democracia, cual es el diseño institucional de los referendos 
revocatorios, el papel de sus principales actores y los resultados de los dos procedimientos.
PALABRAS CLAVE: referendos revocatorios, mecanismos de democracia directa, 
representación, democracia, legitimidad.
Introduction
Since . the . early .nineties, . the .Andean . countries .have .undergone .meaningful .
transformations .of .their .legal .frameworks, .moving .from .purely .representative .
systems .to .the .incorporation .of .institutions .for .citizen .participation . .Colom-
bia .and .Peru .were .the .first .in .promoting .these .changes, .through .constituent .
assemblies .in .1991 .and .1993, .respectively . .More .recently, .the .attempts .to .pro-
mote .recall .referenda .– .a mechanism .of .direct .democracy .(MDD) .initiated .by .
the .people .to .decide .about .the .interruption .of .their .elected .officials’ .mandate .
– .against .the .capital .cities’ .mayors, .Susana .Villarán .in .Lima .(2013), .and .Gus-
tavo .Petro .in .Bogota .(2014), .has .placed .these .countries .at .the .vanguard .again . .
Despite .the .similarities, .there .are .striking .differences, .starting .with .the .recall .
itself, .which .took .place .in .Lima, .whereas .it .was .canceled .in .Bogota, .because .
the .mayor .was .dismissed .by .the .National .Attorney .before .the .scheduled .elec-
tions . .The .aim .of .this .paper .is .to .analyze .the .consequences .of .these .processes .
and .their .results .for .deepening .democracy .
Ideally, . the . link . between . recall . referenda . and . democracy . can . be . seen .
through .a double .approach: .on .one .hand, .when .a recall .referendum .takes .pla-
ce, .it .could .be .considered .as .a good .democratic .sign . .This .would .be .because .
– .once .the .legal .requirements .are .achieved .– .officials .decide .not .to, .or .cannot, .
activate .ad hoc mechanisms .to .avoid .a legal .process .against .them, .demonstra-
ting .the .strength .of .an .institutional .framework .that .promotes .accountability . .
On .the .other .hand, .in .contexts .of .crisis .and .polarization, .the .recall .referenda .
could .provide .an .institutional .solution .to .conflicts .of .legitimacy, .ensuring .the .
survival .of .the .rule .of .law .and .the .same .democracy’s .survival . .This .is .to .say .
that .recall .referenda .could .be .seen .as .a consequence .of .good .democratic .per-
formance, .and, .at .the .same .time .they .could .also .operate .as .a mechanism .to .
strengthen, .or .at .least .preserve, .democracy .in .times .of .crisis . .It .can .be .assumed .
that .this .was .the .expectation .that .led .the .constituent .assemblies .to .create .the .
mechanism . .But .legislation .does .not .necessarily .build .institutions .
Institutions .are .rules .that .enforce .the .action, .assuming .that .they .are .un-
derstood, .endorsed .and .accepted .by .those .who .are .subjected .to .them .(Os-
trom .1986) . .O’Donnell .(1996) .indicates .that .institutions .establish .which .of .
the .agents .– .based .on .what .kind .of .resources .and .procedures .– .are .accepted .
as .valid .participants .in .the .decision .making .process . .At .the .same .time, .these .
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criteria .are .adapted .by .some .actors .and .force .others .to .redefine .themselves . .
Institutions .also . suggest . a  likely .distribution .of . results .while . they .exclude .
others .– . for . instance, .democratic . institutions .renounce . the .use .of . the .mi-
litary . force . . Institutions .might . as .well . have . an . impact . on . the . actions . and .
organization .of .the .agents .that .interact .with .them . .In .that .sense, .a participa-
tive .mechanism .with .an .ideal .design .that .is .never .employed .might .have .no .
impact2, .but .it .could .also .be .the .case .that .the .legislators’ .expectations .when .
designing . such .mechanism . lead . to . totally .unexpected .behaviors, . even . the .
opposite .of .initial .aims .
This .article .focuses .on .the .recent .recall .referenda .that .took .place .in .Lima .
and .Bogota, . in .order . to .analyze . to .what . extent . these .processes . contributed .
to .strengthen .democracy . .The .text .is .structured .as .follows: .(i) .a review .of .the .
state .of .the .art .is .offered .in .order .to .define .our .analytical, .then .(ii) .the .cases .are .
analyzed, .and .finally .(iii) .the .conclusions .are .drawn .
Citizenship and power
There .is .consensus .that .the .MDDs .that .can .be .activated .“bottom-up”, .through .
signatures’ .collection .and .other .requirements, .allow .the .citizens .to .take .part .
as . a  veto .player . and . innovative . actor . in . the .political . game . (Tsebelis . 1995), .
capable .of .proposing .and .deciding .policies, .because . these .devices .allow .the .
possibility .of .blocking . laws . (optional . referendum), . rejecting . them . (deroga-
tive .referendum), .proposing .or .modifying .them .(legislative .or .constitutional .
initiative), .or .revoking .their .representatives .(recall .referenda) . .These .mecha-
nisms .reinforce .government’s .accountability, .so .they .should .reduce .the .distan-
ce .between .the .rulers’ .actions .and .the .people’s .preferences . .
However, . their .potential . implications . could .be . identified . as . the . reasons .
why .they .are .not .widespread . .Why .would .powerful .actors .share .their .power? .
This .is .even .more .evident .when .studying .the .recall, .because .those .who .were .
responsible . for . its . incorporation .could .be . the .main .ones .affected .by . it . .Re-
search .about . the .promotion .of .bottom-up .MDDs .suggests . two .possible .va-
riables . to . explain . their .development: .  . (i) . critical . contexts . in .which . there . is .
a widespread . perception . of . government . inefficiency . or . corruption . and . (ii) .
emergence .of . social . and .political .movements . that . stimulate . citizen .partici-
pation .as .a basic .component .of .their .ideological .proposal .3 .If .the .first .general .
2 .  .It .should .be .also .considered .that .a rule .can .stay .ignored .until . it . is . incorporated .to .the .
political .game . .For .example, .the .popular .initiative .in .Uruguay .(for .constitutional .reform) .and .
the .optional .legislative .referendum .(for .laws .derogation) .were .introduced .into .the .Constitution .
in .1967, .but .the .first .experiences .were .in .the .late .eighties .
3 .  .These . ideas .derive . from . literature .about . the . introduction .of .direct .democracy .mecha-
nisms .into .the .sub .national .level .in .the .United .States .(Spivak .2004, .Garret .2004), .research .about .
participative . democracy . in .Latin .America . (Goldfrank . 2002; . Schneider .& .Welp . 2011) . and . in .
Switzerland .(Auer .2009, .Dardanelli .2011, .Serdült .2014) .
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condition .produces .a favorable .environment, .the .second .one .encourages .the .
demands .for .institutional .change . .
The . discussion . about . the . viability . of . citizen . participation . mechanisms .
confronts .an .elitist .vision .of .democracy .(in .which .the . fear . for . the .“tyranny .
of .the .majority” .and .the .assumed .incapability .of .the .ordinary .citizen .to .make .
decisions .related . to . the .common .interest .predominate .(Schumpeter .1961)4) .
with .another .perspective .that .associates .citizen .participation .with .more .legi-
timate .and .evolved .political .systems .(Almond .& .Verba .1963, .Pateman .1970) . .
This debate .about .the .people’s .role . in .politics .between .electoral .periods .has .
been .complemented .in .recent .decades .by .the .crisis .of .representative .democra-
cy . .This .situation .is .observed .in .the .decreasing .number .of .political .parties .and .
syndicates .and .in .the .increasing .loss .of .confidence .in .these .institutions . .The .
inclusion .of .participation .mechanisms .would .be .an .effort . to .overcome . this .
crisis .(Dalton .et .al . .2001, .Setälä .1999) . .
The .introduction .of .MDDs .was . the .result .of .an .attempt . to . limit . the .ex-
cessive .concentration .of .power .in .governments .during .centralization .or .de-
centralization .processes . . In . the . case .of . the . countries .with . longer . traditions .
– .Switzerland .and .the .United .States .–, .the .incorporation .of .MDDs .dates .from .
the .foundation .of .the .state . .Nevertheless, .whereas .Switzerland .is .considered .
the .first .modern .country .to .introduce .MDDs .at .all .levels .of .government .(Auer .
2009), .in .the .United .States .they .were .introduced .only .at .the .sub .national .level .
(Spivak .2004) . .Regarding .the .recall, .it .is .not .present .at .the .federal .level .in .Swit-
zerland .and .in .the .few .cantons .where .it .has .been .incorporated, .it .is .almost .in .
disuse .(with .the .exception .of .recent .attempts .in .Ticino5), .while .some .authors .
have .observed .increased .use .at .the .American .sub .national .level . . . . .
Analyzing .the .Swiss .case, .Serdült .(2014) .indicates .that .the .few .experien-
ces .– .one .single .activation .and .some .other .attempts .in .more .than .a century .
– .sug .gest .that .the .recall .has .lost .gravity, .becoming .a device .practically .disused . .
This .could .be .due .to: .i) .the .consolidation .and .increasing .importance .of .other .
mechanisms .of .direct .democracy .that .empower .the .citizens .to .intervene .in .the .
definition .of .public .affairs .(instead .of .focusing .on .removing .elected .officials); .
and .ii) . the .horizontal .accountability .which .guarantees .mechanisms .to .solve .
problems .such .as .corruption . .In .the .case .of .the .United .States .this .mechanism .
is . identified .as .an .alternative .when .the .checks .and .balances .(administrative .
penalties, . judicial . controls) . are . not .working . properly . or .when . the . political .
parties .themselves .appeal .to .the .recall .referenda .to .confront .policies .they .re-
ject .(Spivak .2004; .Qvordrup .2014) .
4 .  .Cronin .(1989) .and .Bowler .et .al . .(1998) .describe .this .aspect .in .the .debate .about .the .inclu-
sion .of .DDMs .in .the .national .level .of .the .United .States .(rejected .by .the .legislators) .
5 .  .The .frequent .conflicts .and .inter-party .blockades .in .the .Ticino .have .brought .the .mecha-
nism .back .to .the .agenda . .The .cantons .where .the .recall .can .be .activated .are .Bern, .Uri, .Solothurn, .
Schaffhausen, .Thurgau .and .Ticino .(Serdült .2014) .
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In . the .Andean . countries, . the . incorporation . of .MDDs . – . the . recall . re-
ferendum, .among .them .– .occurred .principally .since .the .nineties, . through .
constituent .assemblies .(Colombia .1991; .Peru .1993; .Ecuador .1998 .and .2008; .
Venezuela .1999; .Bolivia .2009) .6 .In .these .cases, .academics .emphasize .a series .
of .obstacles .that .would .either .hinder .the .use .of .the .recall .or .would .indicate .
that . its .use . is .not . the .result .of . legitimate .social . involvement, .but .a conse-
quence .of .political .manipulation . .Some .scholars .note .that .the .recall .referen-
dum .is .difficult .to .hold .because .of .restrictive .requirements .and .citizenship .
apathy . (Breuer . 2010, .Bustos . 2002) . or .due . to . the . lack .of . independence .of .
electoral .bodies, .which .discourage .the .activation .of .recall .processes .(Jime-
nez .2001, .Welp .2013, .Arques .2014) . .At  the . same . time, . it . is .observed . that .
when . it . is .used, .promoters .are .usually .political .opponents . in . the .shadows .
(Vásquez .Oruna .2014, .Franco .Cuervo .2014) . .On  the .other . side, .however, .
recall .advocates . identify . it .as .a potential . instrument .of .control, .capable .of .
reinforcing .democracy .(Quintanilla .2012) . .
Exploring .the .conditions .in .which .positive .or .negative .outcomes .are .pro-
duced .is .one .of .the .aims .of .this .article . .Our .analysis .is .centered .on .the .suppo-
sition .that .recall .referendums .would .indicate .good .institutional .performance .
when .the .following .conditions .are .fulfilled:
(a) .The .citizenry .promotes .this .mechanism .to .confront .an .authority .that .
has .lost .legitimacy .for .reasons .related .to .(bad) .management .duties;
(b) .If .the .circumstances .require .a recall, .the .competent .institutions .call .it .
and .it .takes .place .with .appropriate .guarantees .for .the .rights .of .the .parties .and .
the .citizenry, .not .only .during .the .campaign .but .also .in .the .elections .
On .the .contrary, . the .recall .would .indicate .problems .in .the .performance .
and .consolidation .of .democracy .if .it .is .employed .by .other .actors .(for .instance, .
political .parties .or .defeated .candidates) .to .settle .political .accounts .not .related .
to .the .management .of .the .authority .involved . .The .same .would .be .the .case .if .
organized .citizens .find .obstacles .created .ad hoc .to .avoid .the .use .of .the .recall, .
even .when .the .formal .requirements .are .fulfilled .
Finally, .the .process .would .contribute .to .reinforce .democracy .if:
(d) .Confidence .in .the .political .system .increases;
(e) .The .confidence .and .administrative .capacity .of .the .confirmed .govern-
ment .grows, .or, .if .the .official .is .removed, .the .conflict .is .solved .through .demo-
cratic .procedures . .
The .mechanism .would .prove .itself .to .be .ineffective .if .the .conflict .remains, .
whether . the .authority . is . removed .or .not, .and .citizens .do .not . increase . their .
confidence .in .the .system .
6 .  .The .recall .referendum .was .previously .introduced .in .Cuba .and .Argentina .(Welp .& .Serdült .
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Analysis
Before .beginning .with .the .analysis .of .the .cases .we .will .outline .some .aspects .
related .to .the .introduction, .regulation .and .practice .of .recall .referenda .in .Co-
lombia .and .Peru .
In .Colombia, .the .recall .was .included .by .the .1991 .constituent .assembly .gathe-
red .in .Bogota .that .was .called .in .response .to .a citizen .demand .expressed .by .the .
movement .known .as .“la .séptima .papeleta” .(the .seventh .ballot), .which .requested .
a constitutional .reform .to .end .with .violence, .narco-terrorism, .corruption .and .the .
increasing .citizenship .apathy .(for .example, .the .level .of .abstention .in .the .elections .
for .the .constituent .assembly .reached .75 .per .cent) . .An informal .referendum, .sub-
sequently .accepted .by .the .authorities, .asked .for .the .reform .and .the .inclusion .of .
mechanisms .of .direct .and .participatory .democracy .(Thomas .Acuña .2000) . .
In .contrast . to .the .popular .pressure . in .Colombia, . the .constitutional .pro-
cess . in . Peru .was . promoted . by .Alberto . Fujimori . in . 1993 . to . give . a  solution .
to .the .coup .organized .by .the .government .itself, .which .closed .the .Congress . .
The international .reaction .to .the .breakdown .of .legality, .particularly .the .role .
of .the .Organization .of .the .American .States .(OAS) .applying .pressure .for .the .
restoration .of .legality, .led .to .Fujimori’s .compromise .of .calling .for .a constituent .
assembly . .MDDs .were .introduced .together .with .some .controversial .reforms, .
such .as .the .elimination .of .one .of .the .chambers .of .parliament .and .the .abolition .
of .death .penalty .(Levitsky .1999) .
In .Colombia, .the .debate .about .the .incorporation .included .references .to .the .
democratic .evolution .required .to .make .use .of .the .participatory .mechanisms .7 .
The .constituent .Antonio .Galan .Sarmiento .suggested .a recall .referendum .based .
on .the .programmatic: .“As .the .sovereignty .resides .in .the .people .(…) .it .consents .
a mandate .to .its .elected .authorities, .whose .clarity .will .depend .on .stating .a pro-
gram .before .the .elections, .which .the .candidate .commits .himself .to .defend .and .
in .case .of . incompletion . the .people .can .revoke .his .mandate” . (“Constitutional .
Journal”, .081/1991: .8–9) . .In .Peru .the .recall .was .suggested .as .a compensation .for .
the .extension .of .the .mayors’ .terms .from .three .to .five .years . .It .was .introduced .as .
a political .right, .so .its .activation .demands .justification .but .not .proof . .In both .ca-
ses .the .recall .can .only .apply .against .sub .national .officials .(different .than .in .Ecua-
dor, .Bolivia .and .Venezuela, .where .all .the .elected .officials .can .be .removed, .even .
the .president) .(Welp .& .Serdült .2011) . .Nevertheless, . in .Colombia .it . is .applied .
only .to .executive .officials .(mayors .and .governors) .whereas .in .Peru .it .is .also .for .
legislators .(see .more .details .in .the .next .section) .
7 .  .Comparative .studies .conducted .to .give .information .to .the .constituent .assembly .reached .
the .conclusion .that .“the .recall .referendum .is .a figure .that .has .been .little .expanded; .as .its .exis-
tence .entails .a developed .political .culture, .not .only .among .voters .but .also .within .political .par-
ties, .movements .and .groups . .That .said .it .is .possible .to .affirm .that .democracy .is .still .in .progress .
and .so .we .cannot .transfer, .not .even .copy .formulas .adopted .by .other .countries .” .(“Constitutional .
Journal”, .066/1991: .97) .
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The .analysis .of .the .experiences .shows .a deep .difference .about .a basic .is-
sue: . the . frequency .of .use . . In .Colombia, . from . the . time . the .mechanism .was .
established .by .Law .134 .in .1994 .until .2013, .only .thirty .six .attempts .led .to .a re-
ferendum .and .none .of .those .succeeded .since .the .threshold .for .participation .
was .not .reached . .In .Peru, .more .than .five .thousand .officials .have .faced .recall .
processes .in .less .than .twenty .years .(since .1997) .8 .This .establishes .a framework .
of .analysis .of .these .cases, .which .is .presented .in .the .following .section .
Lima
Susana .Villarán .(Fuerza .Social) .became .mayor .of .Lima .after .an .unexpected .
victory .in .the .elections .held .on .October .3rd, .2010 . .In .August .of .that .year, .Vil-
larán’s .candidacy .had .hardly .6% .support, .however, .when .the .National .Jury .of .
Elections .(Juzgado .Nacional .de .Elecciones, .JNE) .disqualified .one .of .the .two .
favorites, .Alex .Kouri .Buchamar .(he .could .not .prove .a permanent .residence .in .
Lima .during .the .previous .two .years), .the .leader .of .Fuerza .Social .became .the .
rival .of .Lourdes .Flores .Nano, .from .Popular .Christian .Party .(Partido .Popular .
Cristiano, .PPC) . .Accused .of .being .a representative .of .the .radical .left, .Villarán .
faced .the .opposition .of .media .corporations . .Her .candidacy .was .only .support-
ed .by .the .progressives . .From .the .start .her .administration .was .weak, .winning .
the .elections .by .a mere .0, .83% .9 .Although .the .electoral .law .grants .an .absolute .
majority .in .the .council, .her .party .did .not .win .in .any .of .the .42 .districts .of .Met-
ropolitan .Lima . .
Once .in .office, .Villarán .made .several .decisions .that .would .gain .her .power-
ful . enemies . .Barely . a  hundred .days . after . she . took .office, . she . presented . the .
results . of . an . audit . denouncing . the .mismanagement . of . public . funds . by . the .
previous .mayor, .Castañeda .Lossio; .she .was .determined .to .regulate .the .local .
public .transport .system, .controlled .by .mafias; .and .later, .she .gave .support .to .
the .LGBT .movement .(lesbians, .gays, .transsexuals .and .bisexuals) .in .a country .
where .the .conservative .faction .of .the .Catholic .Church .has .strong .influence .10 .
In .this .context, .an .attempt .to .activate .the .recall .was .not .unexpected .
In .Peru, .the .recall .referendum .can .be .called .between .the .second .and .third .
year .of .a term, .the .application .must .be .properly .based .but .not .necessarily .pro-
ven .(some .arguments .need .to .be .offered .but .it .is .not .necessary .to .present .proof .
and .there .is .not .an .evaluation .of .the .validity .of .the .reasons) . .The .referendum .is .
8 .  .For .detailed .analysis .see .Welp .2013 .
9 . http://portal .jne .gob .pe/informacionelectoral/estadisticaelectoral/COMPENDIO_ESTA-
DISTICO .pdf
10 . Vásquez .Oruna .(2014) .stresses .the .relevance .that .would .have .had .the .change .in .terms .of .
government .style, .referred .to .the .advertisement .of .public .works . .Different .from .what .had .hap-
pened .in .the .previous .administration, .Villarán .argued .that .“The .resources .are .from .the .people .
and .there .is .no .reason .why .I should .put .my .name .on .the .public .works .made .with .the .people´s .
resources” .(“Diario .La .Primera”, .Las obras de Villarán, .July, .8th .2011) .
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individual, .but .if .more .than .a third .of .the .Council .is .revoked, .the .law .mandates .
for .a new .election .to .be .hold .in .order .to .replace .(only) .those .who .were .recalled . .
This .promotes .“perverse .incentives” .(Tuesta .Soldevilla .2014), .that .generate .con-
ditions .under .which .political .leaders .try .to .activate .recall .referenda .in .order .to .
reach .power, .in .scenarios .of .low .institutionalization .of .political .parties .and .high .
political .party . fragmentation .and .volatility . .Twenty .five .percent .of . signatures .
is . required . to . initiate .a  recall, .but . the . total .figure .cannot .surpass .an .absolute .
number .of .400 .000 .signatures; .this .puts .Lima .in .a special .situation: .in .2011, .less .
than .7 .percent .of . signatures .were .enough . to .promote .a  recall . .Besides, . there .
is .not .a deadline .for .signature .collection11, .which .allows .the .instigators .to .take .
advantage .of .any .incident .that .may .occur .during .the .process .
The .recall .was .requested .by .Marco .Tulio .Gutiérrez, .a former .local .counci-
lor .from .United .Left .(Izquierda .Unida .1980–1983) .who .had .been .an .adviser .
to .Lucio .Castañeda . .From .the .very .beginning, . the .recall .was .backed .by .ca-
rriers, .street .merchants .from .the .city .center, . .inhabitants .on .the .left .bank .of .
Rimac .River, .organizations .for .the .handicapped .and .some .former .Lima .offi-
cials . .Conservative .factions .of .the .Catholic .Church .also .embraced .it .(Vásquez .
Oruna .2014) .
In .July .2012, .the .promoters .presented .400,396 .signatures .to .recall .the .ma-
yor .and .the .whole .council . (40 .members), .with . the . intention .of .calling .new .
elections . .Questions . about . the . validity . of . the . signatures . started . a  long . and .
disputed .process .between .the .promoters .and .the .three .institutions .responsible .
for .the .electoral .process .in .Peru .(RENIEC, .ONPE, .JNE) . .Finally, .the .JNE .(Na-
tional .Jury .of .Elections) .announced .a referendum .scheduled .by .March .17th, .
2013 .“for .inefficiency .in .administrative .performance” .
The .position .of .the .political .parties .supports .the .idea .that .their .fragmenta-
tion .and .low .institutionalization .could .be .an .explanation .for .the .constant .use .
of .recalls .in .small .Peruvian .districts, .where .volatility .jeopardizes .survival .and .
feeds .the .anti-establishment .attitudes .(while .parties .with .long-lasting .expec-
tations .would .be .reluctant .to .initiate .an .endless .dynamic .of .recall .referenda) . .
The .recall .was .backed .by .the .Aprista .Party .(Partido .Aprista), .and .the .evangelic .
“National .Restoration . .National .Solidarity” .(Restauración .Nacional . .Solidari-
dad .Nacional), .represented .by .Luis .Castañeda, .who .gave .support .a few .days .
before .the .elections .were .held . .The .conservative .PPC, .led .by .Lourdes .Flores .
(who .had .lost . the .elections .to .Villarán), .was .against . the .recall, .arguing .that .
regular .elections .were .the .best .mechanism .to .exercise .accountability . .Fujimo-
rism .(Fujimorismo), . led .by .Keiko .Fujimori, .did .not . take .a position .and . let .
supporters .decide .the .issue . .Ollanta .Humala’s .party .did .not .release .an .official .
statement .on .the .matter .even .though .some .of .its .leading .members .spoke .out .
against .the .recall .referendum . .Other .groups .that .pronounced .against .the .recall .
were .Popular .Action .(Acción .Popular), .We .are .Peru .(Somos .Perú), .Possible .
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Peru .(Perú .Posible), .Alliance .for .Progress .(Alianza .por .el .Progreso) .and .the .
Nationalist .Party .(Partido .Nacionalista) .(“La .República”, .12/13/2012)
Given .the .fact .that .in .Peru .the .recall .referendum .is .an .individual .process, .
a vote .for .each .member .of . the .council .was .required . .As .a result, . the .mayor .
was .ratified12, .but .the .removal .of .most .members .of .the .council .led .her .to .lose .
the .absolute .majority .after .new .elections .were .settled .by .proportional .system .
(contrary .to .regular .elections, .that .warrant .absolute .majority .for .the .winner) . .
Besides .the .governability .crisis .that .recalls .seem .to .induce, .it .apparently .has .
not .contributed .to .a solution .of .the .conflict .between .the .different .actors, .since .
those .who .intended .to .remove .the .mayor .have .continued .with .their .demands, .
starting . a  process . to . remove . her . due . to . mismanagement . and . inefficiency .
(the alternative .that .happened .in .Bogota) .
Bogota
Gustavo .Francisco .Petro .Urrego, .candidate .from .the .Progresistas .movement .
(Progresistas), . became .mayor .of .Bogota .obtaining . the .32,2% .of . the .vote . in .
elections . that . registered .a 47,7% . turnout . .He .was . followed .by . the . candida-
te . from . the . alliance .of . the .Green .Party-Social .Party .of . the .National .Union .
(Partido .Verde-Partido .Social .de .la .Unidad .Nacional), .Enrique .Peñalosa, .who .
received .24,98% .of .the .votes . .Gina .Parody .(independent .candidate) .was .the .
third, .with .the .16,76% .13 . .
Petro’s .administration .began .on .October .1st, .2012 . .By .December .of . that .
year, .the .National .Attorney .had .decided .to .investigate .presumed .irregularities .
in .the .creation .of .a new .cleaning .and .garbage .collection .system .and .the .con-
tracts .related .to .it . .This .is .one .of .many .examples .of .officials .who .were .inves-
tigated, .penalized .and .dismissed .by .the .current .National .Attorney, .Alejandro .
Ordoñez .(who .dismissed .49 .governors .and .ex-governors, .and .828 .mayors .and .
ex-mayors .between .2009 .and .2013), .representative .of .the .Colombian .conser-
vatives .(Franco .Cuervo .2014) .
Almost . simultaneously, . Petro . had . to . face . another . challenge, . due . to . the .
January .2013 .request .for .a recall .referendum .presented .by .Miguel .Gómez .Mar-
tínez .(representative .for .Bogota, .member .of .the .U Party) . .Among .the .many .
causes .he .alleged .were . the .deterioration . in .mobility . in . the .city, . the .garbage .
collection .system .and .the .national .health .care .system .(“El .Tiempo”, .1/2/2014) . .
In .Colombia, .only .mayors .and .governors .can .be .removed . . .The .causes .that .
justify .a request .are .general .dissatisfaction .of .the .citizenry .and .incompletion .
of .the .government .program; .the .recall .referendum .can .be .activated .after .one .
12 . Among .other .reasons, .the .dissemination .of .a recording .showing .that .the .ex-mayor .Casta-
ñeda .(denounced .by .Villarán .for .mismanagement .and .misapplication .of .public .funds) .was .re-
lated .to .the .recall, .even .though .he .had .denied .it, .convinced .many .voters .to .support .the .mayor .
13 .  .Source: .http://w3 .registraduria .gov .co/escrutinio/resultados .
80
Dossier
América Latina: procesos 
y tendencias electorales
year . in .office .at . the .Registry .of . the .district . (art . . 65) . .According . to . the .Law .
131/1994, .to .call .a referendum .requires .the .support .of .40% .of .the .valid .votes .
in .the .election .of .the .official . . .The .recall .vote .will .only .be .valid .if .the .level .of .
participation .is .at .least .55% .of .the .vote .in .the .original .election . .This .require-
ment .was .a result .of .the .modifications .introduced .by .the .Law .741/2012 . .Those .
modifications .sought .to .reduce .the .legal .obstacles .and .resulted .in .a great .in-
crease .in .the .number .of .recalls .requested .since .2003 .(Franco .Cuervo .2014) . .
Still, . the .country .presents .a weak .tradition . in .the .use .of . this .mechanism .in .
comparison .with .other .cases .(Welp .2013), .and .every .time .recall .elections .were .
held, . the .officials . involved .were . ratified .due . to . the .high . level .of .abstention, .
invalidating .the .elections . .In .order .to .remove .the .public .official, .that .option .
must .be .supported .by .half .plus .one .of .the .voters .
Once .the .signatures .presented .by .the .promoter .were .validated .– .a mini-
mum .of .289 .263 .were .required .– .the .Registry .from .the .district .gave .effect .to .
the .recall .in .June . .Petro .appealed .and .was .able .to .postpone .the .call .for .elec-
tions .– .expected .for .November .2013 .– .until .March .2nd .2014 . .The .participa-
tion .threshold .was .1 .234 .214 .voters . .Instead, .in .December .2013, .the .National .
Attorney .removed .the .mayor .and .he .was .unable .to .exercise .public .functions .
(Res . .340/2014), .a sentence .that .was .considered .disproportionate .and .initiated .
a  discussion . about . the . competency . of . the .National .Attorney . .According . to .
article .278 .of .the .Colombian .Constitution, .among .many .other .functions, .the .
National .Attorney . is .able . to: .“1 . .Remove .from .office, .with .previous .hearing .
and . justified .reason, . the .public .officer .who .commits . the . following .offences: .
infringe . with . evidence . the . Constitution . or . the . law; . derive . undue .material .
advantage . from .the .exercise .of . functions; .  .hinder . in . serious .way . the . inves-
tigations .promoted .by .the .National .Attorney .or .any .administrative .or .juris-
dictional .authority; .act .with .manifest .negligence .during .the .investigation .and .
penalization .of .disciplinary .offenses .committed .by .his .employees, .or .related .to .
complaints .about .punishable .deeds .with .his .knowledge .while .the .exercise .of .
office” . .Therefore, .Petro .appealed .to .the .Interamerican .Court .of .Human .Rights .
for .legal .protection; .it .asked .the .Colombian .government .to .suspend .the .effects .
of .the .National .Attorney’s .sentence . .Initially, .the .Santos´ .administration .did .
not .comply .with .the .Court .decision, .but .Petro .was .finally .returned .to .office .
on .April .23, .2014 .
The .recall .attempt .became .a national, .and .even .regional, .issue14, .and .the .
question .about . the .power .of . the .National .Attorney .to .remove .a democra-
tic . authority .was .debated .by . the .public; . indeed, . the .current .Attorney .was .
accused .of .imposing .penalties .according .to .political .criteria .(“La .Semana”, .
6/22/2013) .
14 . Even . the . “Red .de .Ciudades . Sudamericanas” . expressed .worry . for . the . removal . of .Petro .
through .a public .letter .signed .by .mayors .of .many .South .American .cities .such .as .Augusto .Bar-
rera .(Quito), .Mauricio .Macri .(Buenos .Aires) .and .Susana .Villarán .(mayor .of .Lima, .who .had .also .
faced .a recall .referendum) .(“Noticias .Quito”, .11/12/2013) . .
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At .first .the .mayor .seemed .to .be .in .favor .of .the .recall .election .in .pursuit .of .
democratic .strength .and .as .a way .to .(re) .legitimize .his .administration .against .
an .increasingly .unfavorable .public .opinion . .According .to .a survey .by .Ipsos-
Napoleon .Franco .from .April, .2013, .61% .were .dissatisfied .with .Petro’s .admi-
nistration, .and .only .28% .were .satisfied . .However, .once .the .recall .was .immi-
nent, .Petro .complemented .his .strategy .of .supporting .mobilization .with .legal .
proceedings .to .delay .the .elections .and .delegitimize .the .recall .process . .Never-
theless, .when .removal .by .the .Attorney .became .the .most .urgent .problem, .the .
recall .became .an .instrument .of .Petro .to .appeal .to .the .popular .will .against .the .
decision .of .a non .democratic .institution .(Rey .2014) .
Petro´s .supporters .promoted .the .“no .campaign”, .principally .through .the .
social .networks .– .accusing .the .most .important .media .of .being .a monopoly .of .
the .national .government .– .successfully .calling .for .multiple .manifestations .at .
Bogota’s .Plaza .Bolivar . .To .promote .the .mobilization .of .supporters, .the .“Com-
mittee .for .the .Defense .of .Human .Bogotá” .(“Comité .de .Defensa .de .la .Bogota .
Humana”) .was .created, .organized .into .more .than .thirty .“nodes” .gathering .di-
fferent .social .groups .(animal .defense .groups, .LGBT .movement, .political .par-
ties, .indigenous .groups, .ex-members .of .M19, .syndicates, .recyclers, .left-wing .
organizations, . among . others) . .The . results . were . evident . as . Petro´s . positive .
image .reached .62%; .which .seemed .to .show .popular .rejection .to .his .removal .
(“La .Silla .Vacía”, .02/09/2014) . .
Conclusions
The .first .question .these .conclusions .try .to .answer .is .the .legitimacy .or .social .su-
pport .for .the .recall .process . .That .leads .to .a consideration .of, .among .other .things, .
the .promoters .of .those .initiatives .and .the .quorum .of .the .people .necessary .to .
endorse .and .validate .the .recall .referenda . .The .previous .analysis .presents .a com-
plex .image . .Considering .the .number .of .signatures .required .to .promote .a recall, .
in both .cases .the .evidence .suggests .that .the .signatures .were .collected . .Further-
more, .several .surveys .expressed .people´s .dissatisfaction .with .both .administra-
tions . .But .then .again, .is .that .dissatisfaction .unique .to .those .two .cases .(the .man-
dates .of .Villarán .and .Petro) .or .is .it .a common .fact .that .affects .all .administrations .
in .Latin .American .big .cities, .characterized .by .numerous .problems .and .lack .of .
resources .to .solve .them? .Vásquez .Oruna .(2014: .51) .addresses .this .issue .in .her .
analysis .about .Lima .and .comes .to .the .conclusion .that .the .Villarán .administra-
tion .was .not .out .of . the . spectrum .compared . to .previous .mandates . .The .high .
abstention .and .the .numerous .crises .happening .in .Bogota, .in .particular, .and .Co-
lombia, .in .general, .seem .to .lead .to .a similar .scenario . .This .is .the .context .where .
people’s .disappointment .converges .with .the .interests .of .politicians .who .openly .
or .secretly .choose .to .manipulate .the .rules .according .to .their .convenience . .
In .Lima, .once .the .formal .requirements .were .fulfilled, .the .process .was .con-
ducted . .Though .there .were .confrontations .and .controversies .(false .signatures, .
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among .many .other . irregularities) .Villarán’s . attitude .and .her . respect . for . the .
rule .of .law .seem .to .have .contributed .to .keeping .the .electoral .process .going . .
On . the . other . hand, . the . irregularities . observed . in . the .Colombian . case, . the .
questionable . intervention .by . the .National .Attorney . and . the . erratic . attitude .
of .Petro .(first .he .declared .himself .in .favor, .then .he .was .against .it, .and .finally .
agreed .to .hold .the .referenda), .reveal .weaknesses .of .the .institutional .structure .
Finally, .and .despite .the .differences .between .the .two .cases, .neither .of .them .
seemed .to .have .contributed .to .the .strengthening .of .democracy . .In .Lima, .this .
could .be .attributed .to .the .fact .that .even .when .Villarán .was .ratified, .she .lost .her .
absolute .majority .and .her .government .suffered .transformations .affecting .its .
governability .(it .lived .in .a constant .campaign .first, .with .interim .members .later .
and .without .majority .after .the .elections), .while .the .opposition .did .not .accept .
the .results .as .legitimate .and .continued .urging .the .removal .of .the .mayor .from .
office . .In .Bogota, .the .recall .referendum .was .cancelled, .exposing .the .deficien-
cies .of .Colombian .democracy . in . terms .of . its . institutional .design . (excessive .
power .attributed .to .the .National .Attorney) .as .well .as .the .lack .of .respect .for .the .
rules .shown .by .the .different .actors .
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